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Chapter 10
Measuring Pension Wealth
Chris Cunningham, Gary V. Engelhardt, and Anil Kumar
Pension wealth plays a critical role in older individuals’ retirement behavior
and financial security. Accordingly, the magnitude and distribution of pen-
sion wealth is important in the ongoing debate about whether households,
especially Baby Boomers, have saved adequately for retirement.1 For this
reason, researchers and policymakers need accurate measures of pension
wealth if they are to assess the impact of pensions, prompting substantial
effort devoted to gathering information on pension characteristics and
wealth from households nearing retirement.2 Unfortunately, there is grow-
ing awareness of the fact that many respondents are unaware of and unable
to articulate many key attributes of their pension plans.3 This has led to con-
cern that respondent-reported pension information may give an inaccurate
picture of older persons’ financial security, and it may also impart bias to
empirical studies of the role of pensions on retirement.4 For this reason,
researchers and policymakers need accurate measures of pension wealth
if they are to assess the impact of pensions, prompting substantial effort
devoted to gathering information on pension characteristics and wealth
from households nearing retirement.5
To supplement respondent-reported pension information, some analysts
have turned to pension plan reports and administrative data, seeking to
generate more accurate measures of pension wealth. For example, the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) linked lifetime earnings records from
the Social Security Administration (SSA) and pension plan rules collected
from employer-provided pension Summary Plan Descriptions (SPDs) for
many respondents. These can then be used in concert with the Pension
Estimation Program (PEP), a computer software program which calculates
pension entitlements at alternative retirement dates. This approach is gain-
ing favor for measuring retirement wealth for policy analysis.
Our research, summarized in this chapter, describes a long-term effort
to develop an improved methodology for measuring defined contribution
(DC) pension wealth of older Americans. Specifically, we have devised a
new pension benefit calculator that can be used with the HRS, which we
call the HRS DC/401(k) Calculator. This new software extends researchers’
ability to model DC plans, building in detailed plan characteristics and
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time-varying rates of return, annual earnings, and pre-tax deferrals. We are
able to show that prior estimates of pension wealth have probably over-
stated DC plan wealth by as much as 20 percent, and 401(k) plan balances
by as much as 40 percent. The findings imply that accurate measurement
of pension wealth hinges on a set of complex assumptions, and even
small changes in assumptions can generate large differences in pension
wealth and substantively change policy prescriptions. We also believe that
administrative pension data is invaluable in supplementing respondent-
reported information from household surveys. Accordingly, those engaged
in or starting surveys of older households should devote substantial effort
to incorporate such data into their research designs.
In what follows, we begin with a brief description of pension informa-
tion found in the Health and Retirement Study, which is the basis for
most research on Baby Boomers and their retirement preparedness. Next,
we present new estimates of DC pension wealth for the first ‘original’
HRS cohort interviewed in 1992, based on the employer-provided plan
descriptions and administrative data, and we compare our results with those
generated from previous methodology. Then we extend the analysis for the
cohort of so-called War Babies (WBs), first interviewed by the HRS in 1998.
Finally, we offer a summary and implications for research.
Methodology for Generating Pension Wealth for DC
Pension Participants
Several sources of data have been gathered that are useful in producing
estimates of pension wealth for DC plan participants. Here we discuss
various approaches to combining these.
Respondent Reports
In surveys designed to elicit retirement wealth including the HRS, respon-
dents and spouses are routinely asked to describe their pensions on their
current and past jobs. Specifically, in the HRS, respondents are asked first
if they are included in a pension, retirement, or tax-deferred savings plan.
If the individual answers ‘yes’, then he is asked additional detailed ques-
tions about as many as three plans on that job. This respondent-reported
information includes the type of plan (e.g. formula-based (DB), account-
based (DC), or combination). In addition, questions are asked about the
number of years the worker has been included in the plan, the amount
of the employer contribution, the amount of the employee contribution,
and the plan balance. If the individual has more than three plans on the
current job, then the sum of the balances on the fourth and higher plans
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is requested. Those with a DC plan are asked to identify the type: thrift
or savings, 401(k)/403(b)/SRA, profit-sharing, stock purchase/employee
stock ownership (ESOP), and other. Answers to these pension questions
have been used to calculate respondent-reported pension assets including
401(k) assets.
The primary advantage of respondent-reported DC wealth is that it can
be thought of as reflecting what a household believes its pension plan
balance to be at the time of the survey. Yet substantial measurement error
can plague these data. One reason is that respondents may report their
pension plan type incorrectly; for instance, a worker who really has a DB
may report having a DC plan (or vice versa); a respondent with a non-
401(k) DC plan could report having a 401(k); someone with a DB and a
401(k) plan could report just one plan, and so on. Another problem is
that even if individuals correctly identify their plan type, they may report
plan values inaccurately. This may be particularly true for DB participants,
as these plans embody complicated formulas based on salary, age, years
of service, early and normal retirement dates, about which the respon-
dent may not be aware; even small errors in reporting early and normal
retirement ages for such plans can dramatically alter the implied accrual
profiles and present value calculations. In addition, measurement error in
reported plan type is almost surely correlated with error in reported plan
value. Finally, research on HRS respondents’ plan reports indicates that
there are many missing values which must be imputed by the researcher
in order to arrive at pension wealth numbers. Thus Venti and Wise (2000)
report that records for almost 40 percent of HRS households require that at
least one piece of pension information be imputed to construct measures
of self-reported pension wealth. Such imputations can result in additional
measurement error.6
Employer-Based Plan Information
To complement this respondent-reported pension information, the HRS
also attempted to collect pension SPDs from employers of HRS respondents
for all current and previous jobs in which the respondent reported being
covered by a pension. Researchers at the University of Michigan then coded
these SPDs and linked them to a software program called the PEP. Taking
this as inputs, estimates of DC pension wealth can be generated along with
assumptions about earnings and saving trajectories, rates of return and
inflation. Nevertheless, the PEP makes some simplifying assumptions in
its modeling strategy for calculating DC wealth, including the assumption
of a single time-invariant rate of return common to all participants, a
time-invariant inflation rate, a time-invariant voluntary contribution rate
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to 401(k)-type plans, a simple earnings forecasting equation for career
earnings, and the presumption of plan eligibility since the date of hire (cf.
Rohwedder 2003; Engelhardt et al. 2005).
By contrast, our pension Calculator software includes a more flexible
set of economic assumptions for estimating DC wealth. We also include
an additional source of data, namely lifetime earnings histories provided
under restricted data conditions by the SSA.7 The great advantage of
these records is that they provide an accurate source of earnings from
1980 and also reports of pre-tax employee contributions to pension plans
since 1984. Unlike respondent-reported information, these reports are
not subjected to measurement error as they represent employer official
reports on earnings and deferrals (Cunningham and Engelhardt 2002).
This information, combined with respondent-reported earnings, permits
us to construct a complete earnings history from 1951 to the survey
entry year, for those who entered the HRS in 1992 and 1998. We believe
that the improved earnings data, combined with the enhanced pension
wealth Calculator, generate substantially better calculations of DC pension
wealth.
The Calculator is designed so that it can replicate the PEP, but it also
incorporates several important innovations not found in the earlier pro-
gram. Specifically, it (a) invokes plan adoption and amendment dates indi-
cated in the SPD to determine eligibility for plan features, (b) allows time-
varying, individual-specific rates of return, (c) allows time-varying inflation
rates, (d) allows time-varying, individual-specific voluntary contribution
rates, and (e) allows easier, more direct use of administrative earnings data.
It does not attempt to estimate DB wealth, which is handled quite well by
the PEP.8
Pension Wealth Computations: Replicating
the Baseline
To show how the Calculator works, we first seek to replicate the results
generated by the PEP; subsequently, we will demonstrate how changing
assumptions and data alter results. Accordingly, we first compare the total
DC plan balances evaluated at the time of job severance, known as the quit
date, generated by both approaches.9
For replication purposes, each plan can be characterized as belonging to
one of three types. First, for the majority of plans, the Calculator and PEP
produce identical output. Second, there is a small group of plans for which
the Calculator and Program fail to produce the same output, because of
identifiable programming anomalies in the PEP.10 The Calculator contains
two sets of code for these plans: the first is the correct code and the second
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overrides the correct code and hard-codes the plans to match the Pro-
gram’s coding.11 Finally, there is a very small set of plans, covering around
5 percent of the DC plan participants in 1992, for which the Calculator
and Program fail to produce the same output because of unidentifiable
programming anomalies.12 As a result, when comparing output from the
Calculator and the PEP, there may be a small number of participants and
plans for which there is potentially large disagreement.
Table 10-1 summarizes some key outcomes across the two programs.
Here, we report the DC plan balance at the quit date for some 2,352 respon-
dents in the HRS Participant Data.13 The Calculator is parameterized to
replicate the PEP, and we assume a time-invariant real rate of return of
2.3 percent, inflation of 4 percent, self-reported earnings from the HRS
interview and wage equation parameters from the default Participant file,
and time-invariant voluntary contributions equal to what respondents self-
report in the initial interview (the default in the Participant file). We also
assume that participants were eligible for both employer and employee
contributions to the plan since their hire date.14
The first row of the table reflects the absolute value of the percentage
difference between the plan balances computed under the Calculator and
the PEP; the mean difference is 5.7 percent. Of course, the mean includes
outliers, as is evident from the 75th percentile of the distribution; the fact
that this is 0 indicates that at least 75 percent of the participants have
exact matches. At the 90th percentile, the percentage difference between
the two programs is just under 4 percent. Therefore, the disagreement
between the two programs is less than 4 percent for 90 percent of the
participants. What drives the mean difference of 5.7 percent is a relatively
small number of plans and participants for which the programs do not
agree which show up in the 95th and higher percentiles (these are the
programming anomalies mentioned above). We note that differences of
around 15 percent, as seen for the 95th percentile, are not that surprising
given that even tiny differences are compounded over time in DC plans. In
contrast, the observed difference of 116 percent at the 99th percentile is
almost surely more systemic in nature.
Table 10-2 shows the Calculator’s results for separate runs that illustrate
the impact of the hard-coding of plans to match the PEP. Specifically,
the first row in panel A shows selected statistics on plan balances at quit
date, when the Calculator invokes hard-coding to match the Program. In
the second row, we show the same statistics when plans are coded in a
manner more consistent with others. In general, hard-coding results in
lower plan balances as of the quit date: the mean difference of 6.6 per-
cent (or $14,392) and the median is 5.4 percent (or $1,648). In other
words, the differences are larger at higher percentiles in the distribu-
tion, so that at the 95th percentile, the balances differ by 9.5 percent.
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One difficulty with the analysis of plan balances at the retirement date
is that individuals in the analysis sample are of different ages and have
different retirement dates. This means that the balances in Panel A are not
measured in the same calendar year’s dollars. Panel B of the table addresses
this and shows the same statistics, but for the expected present value of
DC wealth in 1992, which takes into account the probability of survival
to the retirement date. At the mean, DC pension wealth is 8.4 percent
higher when hard-coding is not invoked. At the median, this difference
is 6 percent, and it remains at this level even up to the 95th percentile.
Sensitivity of Pension Wealth Computations to
Economic Assumptions
The Calculator is designed to allow the researcher to explore the impact
of moving away from default economic and plan assumptions, should the
researcher seek this flexibility. In what follows, we briefly outline how
varying these influences estimates of DC wealth (see also Rohwedder 2003;
Engelhardt et al. 2005).
Time-Varying Rates of Return
When calculating DC wealth with the PEP, the researcher chooses the rate
of return to use, but the Program assumes for the pension calculations that
the real rate of return is common across individuals and time-invariant.
For example, in a commonly used parameterization for 1992, the real rate
of return is assumed to be 2.3 percent, which was the SSA’s intermediate
forecast in that year. This means that the PEP assumes that real returns
are always 2.3 percent, commonly experienced by all participants. The
potential impact of this assumption depends on the application.
In fact, of course, real rates of return have varied substantially over time
(see Appendix, Table 10A-1). For the 20 years prior to the 1992 HRS, the
mean 1972–91 real return for the portfolio of bonds was 2.6 percent with
substantial variation ranging from −16.8 percent in 1979 to 31.6 percent in
1982. In principle, for any given across-period mean return, the DC balance
at the end of that period will be path-dependent; that is, the temporal pat-
tern of deviations from that mean return matters for DC balances because
of the role of compounding. In addition, because contributions to DC
plans are defined frequently as a percentage of pay, the temporal pattern
of real returns will interact with the shape of the age-earnings profile to
generate differences in plan balances that would not be captured under
the assumption of a time-invariant mean rate of return.
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It is also worth noting that DC plans differ, in terms of the financial
instruments in which participants can invest their contributions, and of
course, they will experience different patterns of returns over time.15
Accordingly, in our approach, the Calculator permits both future and past
time-varying rates of return to be used in the calculations. Table 10-3 com-
pares selected statistics on the distribution of plan balances in 1991 using
the historical returns on a portfolio of 100 percent long-term bonds from
Ibbotson (2003), extended back to the earliest start year in the sample; the
mean real return for this period was 1.8 percent.16 Table 10-3 indicates little
difference in plan balances using time-invariant or time-varying returns. Yet
there is an important caveat, in that for any given mean return, the timing
of the annual returns matters. In this particular application, there is little
difference in balances but if the order of the returns were reversed (e.g.
assuming the 1991 return occurred in 1952 etc.), then balances would be
lower with time-varying returns than with time-invariant returns.
Altering Assumptions about Pre-Tax Voluntary
Contributions and Eligibility
Also of interest is how sensitive results are to the PEP assumptions that
(a) pre-tax voluntary contributions to DC plans vary across individuals,
but are time-invariant, and (b) that eligibility for such contributions begins
at the date of hire. While the source of the SPD, the effective date of
the plan, and the effective date of the last amendment of the plan were
collected, the PEP does not incorporate those dates when calculating DC
pension wealth; rather, the software assumes that respondents were eligible
for their plans since they were hired. The potential impact of changing this
assumption depends on the application, but for many research questions
involving DC plans, the timing of when the plan was first available to
the participant is likely to be of great importance for calculating pension
measures. For example, 401(k) plans were not permitted until 1978 and few
were adopted until after 1981 when the IRS issued clarifying regulations for
these plans; for this reason, 1982 can be taken as the de facto earliest year
of 401(k) introduction after which plan adoption rates increased rapidly
(see Figure 10-1). We seek to assess what difference it makes to incorporate
the plan’s inception date, as well as assuming that participants were likely
ineligible for 401(k) saving before 1982.17 Furthermore, some of the volun-
tary pre-tax saving options in the SPDs matched to HRS respondents were
also adopted in the mid- to late-1980s.
Table 10-4 illustrates the impact of these assumptions for DC quit-date
balances and expected present values for a variety of Calculator parameter-
izations. Panel A shows the quit-date balance, and the first row replicates
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Figure 10-1. Private sector pension plan participation by plan type: 1977–96.
(Source: US Department of Labor (2001).)
the baseline results from Table 10-2. The mean and median plan balances
at the quit date are $218,971 and $30,802, respectively. The second row
provides lower results for both figures of $105,297 and 0, respectively,
assuming that participants did not contribute voluntarily in any of the years
since hire. In other words, these statistics indicate balances associated only
with employer and mandatory employee contributions over the course of
employment. This highlights the important role that voluntary saving plays
in DC plan balances, even for HRS workers not exposed to 401(k)-type
pension arrangements for much of their careers. In particular, the mean
amounts to only 48 percent of the baseline computation, which indicates
that voluntary saving (and accrued earnings thereon) comprise about half
of DC balances at retirement; further the typical HRS individual had only a
voluntary-saving provision.18
The third row in Panel A indicates the quit-date balance had all partic-
ipants voluntarily contributed 5 percent of pay each year of employment.
At every percentile, participants now would be predicted to have positive
balances at the quit date: mean and median balances would be $254,778
and $130,356, respectively. The fourth row of Panel A illustrates the impact
of limiting the number of years of eligibility for pre-tax voluntary contri-
butions. This limit is derived from three pieces of information, namely the
plan adoption date, the date of last amendment in the SPD, and the first
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date in which a pre-tax deferral was made from the W-2 data.19 The fourth
row indicates that restricting the years of eligibility has an important impact
on mean quit date DC plan balances; in particular, the mean based on
restricted eligibility for voluntary contributions is $184,736, or 15.6 percent
lower than the first row. Not surprisingly, the impact is largest in the upper
portion of the distribution.
The Impact of Voluntary Contribution Rates from W-2 Data
The final two rows of Panel A in Table 10-4 illuminate how using adminis-
trative records (W-2 data) on pre-tax deferrals changes outcomes, by inte-
grating actual workers’ time-varying, individual-specific voluntary contribu-
tions to their DC plans over time. As Cunningham and Engelhardt (2002)
have previously found, this has the effect of reducing plan balances at the
mean by 17.8 percent compared to the baseline. It is interesting that the
median balance rises by 25 percent, because some participants made actual
contributions in 1984–91 at rates that exceeded what they indicated in their
initial 1992 interviews. In other words, capturing actual contribution rates
in the W-2 data does a much better job of capturing voluntary contribution
patterns.
The final row in Panel A shows the combined impact of using both the W-
2 contribution rates and the restrictions on years of eligibility for voluntary
contributions. The results for quit date balances are striking: means plan
balances are 25.4 percent lower under this parameterization than under
the baseline assumptions, and median plan balances are 12 percent higher.
In other words, the differences compared to the PEP assumptions are not
linear, as the PEP attributes less to the middle group and more to the top
end of the distribution.
Panels B and C of Table 10-4 show similar statistics for expected present
values of DC wealth (in 1992) and plan balances (in 1991), respectively. Our
message is the same: the mean present value of DC wealth is lower by about
20 percent and means plan balances are about 28 percent lower when we
use the W-2 contribution rates and tighter eligibility restrictions.20 It would
appear that the baseline assumptions understate DC wealth in the middle
of the distribution but overstate it at the upper end of the distribution. And
clearly the bottom line is that DC wealth estimates are sensitive to modeling
assumptions.
DC Pension Wealth Estimates Based on
Administrative Earnings Data
Thus far, the analysis has examined the sensitivity of DC wealth estimates
assuming respondent-reported pay at the time of the survey and a very
10 / Measuring Pension Wealth 225
simple earnings projection equation built into the PEP. Next, we turn to
examine how pension wealth numbers differ if we estimate an earnings
model using as input the administrative SSA covered-earnings data from
1951 to 1979 and W-2 data from 1980 to the year prior to the survey
year (1991 for the Original HRS cohort and 1997 for the WBs).21 For
those respondents who gave consent to match administrative earnings data,
parameter estimates from this model and administrative data were used
to construct complete earnings histories for each HRS respondent who
entered in 1992 or 1998.22
The first row of Panel A in Table 10-5 estimates quit-date DC plan bal-
ances for members of the original HRS cohort using these new earnings
trajectories and imposing the eligibility restrictions discussed above.23 The
mean and median DC balances are $321,846 and $68,089, respectively, sub-
stantially higher than the first row of Table 10-4. The second row provides
the plan balances for just the subset of 1,857 individuals who had their
Social Security earnings histories and W-2s linked to the surveys; the results
show that removing individuals for whom earnings had to be imputed raises
the mean to almost $363,528 and is monotonic across the pension-value
distribution.
In the third row of Panel A, we repeat the analysis but instead use the WBs
cohort; the sample is smaller so there are only 551 observations (the match
rate for employer SPDs was also lower and the consent rate for matched
administrative earnings was lower as well). The mean and median DC plan
balances at the quit date were $399,363 and $27,875, respectively. But these
balance figures obscure what appears to be a dramatic increase in pension
wealth inequality. For the original HRS cohort in 1992, the pension balance
at the 75th percentile was about four times larger than the median pension
value. In 1998, for the WBs, the 75th percentile was more than 16 times the
median. Whether this reflects the longer exposure to DC plans by the WBs
or is simply due to differences in those for whom the administrative data
could be obtained is unclear. The fourth row of Panel A shows the balances
at the quit date for the subsample of 311 individuals from the War Baby
cohort who gave permission to link their Social Security earnings; Panels
B and C show the present value of DC wealth and the plan balance in the
survey entry year, respectively.
Some final results appear in Table 10-6, which shows the DC plan
balances due to employee pretax voluntary contributions and associated
employer matching contributions, for the subset of participants from Table
10-6 who had a pretax saving option. Panel A shows that for participants
with matched W-2s, the mean balance from pretax saving excluding the
employer match was $16,850, but the median came to 0; this indicates that
most of the original HRS respondents who were eligible for pretax saving
did not participate in their plans. Indeed, even at the 75th percentile,
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balances are quite modest ($16,839), in sharp contrast with the fourth row
WBs who had longer exposure to 401(k)-type plans; mean and median bal-
ances for them were $94,183 and $33,944, respectively. Panel B shows the
distribution of balances due to employer matching contributions for the
subset of plans that offered matching (about half the plans). Median bal-
ances due to matching are $347 and $10,709 for the original HRS and WBs
cohorts, respectively. Panel C shows balances for the sum of the employee
voluntary and employer matching contributions. Even with matching, the
average balance for the original HRS cohort was only $20,472, substantially
less than the WBs, again reflecting their longer exposure to these DC plans.
Conclusions and Discussion
Inasmuch as pensions represent a substantial component of older house-
holds’ retirement saving, it is critical to measure the level and distribution
of pension wealth properly. Yet asking respondents about their pension
wealth may run the risk of measurement error. In this chapter, we show
how our newly developed Calculator software can be used to construct
alternative estimates of DC plan balances for HRS participants. We have
emphasized the crucial role of economic assumptions, and we demonstrate
several conclusions. First, pension wealth resulting from voluntary saving
(and accrued earnings thereon) comprises half of DC pension wealth cal-
culated for HRS respondents with matched SPDs. Second, our Calculator
yields substantially lower mean estimates of DC pension wealth for HRS
participants than the PEP that has been used to date. In particular, we
calculate DC pension wealth to be 20 percent lower when we use reasonable
modeling assumptions and arguably better input data; wealth in 401(k)-
type pension plans alone is estimated at 40 percent less. Third, most of the
reduction in estimated DC wealth occurs for the right tail of the pension–
wealth distribution. Fourth, the PEP understates DC wealth in the middle
of the pension–wealth distribution. Overall, we find that the mean 401(k)
balance, including employer matching contributions, was about $20,472 for
the original HRS cohort in 1992, but the median was 0; this suggests that
the majority of those eligible did not participate in such plans back then.
By contrast, the later generation known as the WBs had greater and earlier
exposure to such plans; their mean and median balances were $105,209
and $41,798, respectively, indicating the growing importance of 401(k)s in
retirement saving for younger cohorts.
These results suggest that research which has used pension wealth figures
created from HRS sources to date may have mismeasured DC pension
and retirement wealth adequacy for a sizable fraction of HRS participants.
Accordingly, this analysis implies that researchers must think more care-
fully about the economic assumptions underlying pension measures. We
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have shown that the default assumptions in the PEP overstates DC pen-
sion wealth, with the extent of mismeasurement dependent on what the
researcher assumes about eligibility and employer (nonmatching) contri-
butions. In other words, the SPDs alone offer an incomplete picture of
employer pension provisions, which are needed to accurately estimate pen-
sion entitlements to DC plans. Future work will need to recognize that pen-
sion plans are dynamic as well so that SPDs must be collected repeatedly for
covered workers. In addition, it is important to frequently update adminis-
trative records on earnings; fortunately, the HRS has received respondent
consent to update administrative earnings files through 2003. This will
permit substantially more accurate modeling of the dynamics of retirement
and saving behavior of older Americans and cohort trends in retirement
wealth.
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Notes
1 See, e.g. Mitchell and Moore (1998, 2000) and Mitchell et al. (2000).
2 See, for instance, the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS); the English Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA); the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE), which covers Denmark, Sweden, Austria, France, Germany,
Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Greece; and similar ongo-
ing or new surveys in Mexico, New Zealand, Israel, South Korea, and Japan.
3 e.g. Mitchell (1988).
4 See, e.g. Mitchell and Moore (1998, 2000) and Mitchell et al. (2000).
5 See, for instance, the US Health and Retirement Study; the ELSA; the SHARE,
which covers Denmark, Sweden, Austria, France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium,
The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Greece; and similar ongoing or new surveys in
Mexico, New Zealand, Israel, South Korea, and Japan.
6 Gustman and Steinmeier (1999), Johnson et al. (2000), and Engelhardt (2001)
have analyzed pension measurement issues in the HRS.
7 For those who entered the survey in 1992, these data include Social Security
covered-earnings histories from 1951 to 1991 and W-2 earnings records for jobs held
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from 1980 to 1991; for those who entered in 1998, these include covered-earnings
from 1951 to 1997 and W-2s from 1980 to 1997. Unfortunately, these data are not
yet available for the EBB.
8 We refer interested readers to Rohwedder (2003) for an extensive discussion of
the conceptual issues in measuring DC pension wealth from the SPDs and how
those relate to the PEP and to Engelhardt et al. (2005) for detailed descriptions
and comparisons of the two programs. Research that uses the Calculator to model
the impact of DC pension incentives on economic behavior include Cunningham
and Engelhardt (2002) and Engelhardt and Kumar (2005).
9 Our replication is based on the original Pascal version of the Program, which
since has been rewritten in Visual Basic. The (unreported) comparison based on
the Visual Basic version is the same as the VB version matches the Pascal version.
10 These anomalies were brought to the attention to and confirmed by the HRS,
which addressed them in the VB version of the PEP.
11 When parameterizing the Calculator, the user must choose which code to invoke.
12 Specifically, we and the HRS staff compared output from the Calculator and
Program and concluded that the Program’s output appeared to be incorrect for
these plans, but neither we nor the HRS staff could determine the root cause of
the differences. Without knowledge of the underlying problem, there is no way to
specify alternative calculations for these plans to override the Calculator’s code.
13 The sample size of 2,352 individuals is the set of individuals for which both the
Program and Calculator produced output. In the Tables 10-3–10-5, we use a slightly
larger sample of 2,383 individuals based solely on the Calculator’s output.
14 The assumed interest and inflation rates are 1992 SSA intermediate forecasts;
other parameters (aggregate wage growth, etc.) are taken from the default Para-
meter file for the PEP. In other words, this parameterization represents the default
used for Scenario 1 in the HRS-supplied Pension Values Database.
15 These options are coded in the Pension Plan Data file but only for plans that
allow for participant-directed investment of plan balances. The Pension Estimation
Program does not use this information to help define rates of return; the Calcu-
lator does not either, although it does allow the user to output dummy variables
indicating these investment options to the output data set.
16 Calendar year 1991 is chosen for this comparison because it was the last year prior
to the initial 1992 HRS interview, which allows solely for the use of past returns in
the calculations and, from a practical perspective for the purpose of this illustration,
avoids the need to forecast returns beyond 1991. In addition, 1991 is a useful year
because the plan balance is recorded just prior to the initial interview, and the
individual was asked to self-report the plan balance during the interview. This allows
for a comparison of self-reported balances versus those implied by the Calculator.
17 The effective and amendment dates from the SPDs were not used in the PEP
because its designers implicitly assumed that a plan effective as of a particular
calendar year replaced another plan of equal generosity. There is dispute in the
literature about whether 401(k) plans were actually good substitutes for previously
existing pension plans.
18 It is also important to note that the zero balances in the lower percentiles in the
baseline in the first row of Panel A in Table 10-4 occur because participants self-
reported in the initial HRS interview that they made no voluntary contributions in
1992. Under the baseline parameterization, the Calculator assumes that the rate in
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1992 was time-invariant so that if this rate is zero, then that individual was always
and forever will be a noncontributor, and, thus, a zero contribution rate always held
throughout the duration of employment so that the individual ends up with zero
plan balance at retirement. This is what the Program would assume and calculate as
well.
19 Engelhardt et al. (2005) describe the algorithm for determining eligibility in this
fashion in detail.
20 The sample for the plan balance in 1991 is 2,306 individuals, slightly smaller than
in panels A and B, because there were a small number of participants who started
their jobs in 1992 and did not have coverage in 1991.
21 We follow Cunningham and Engelhardt (2002) and Engelhardt and Kumar
(2005) in using administrative earnings to construct career earnings, based on the
parameter estimates from an annual earnings equation using all HRS individuals
with matched Social Security earnings histories. The following model is estimated
using a two-limit Tobit model to account for the censoring imposed from below by
zero earnings from labor force nonparticipation and from above by the FICA cap
on all person-year observations in the Social Security earnings database:
ln(yit ) = Í1t +
G∑
g=1
Í2gt D
OwnEduc g
i + Í3t Ageit + Í4tAge
2
i t + Í5t Age
3
i t + Í6t Age
4
i t
+ Í7t DWhitei + Í8t D
GovtJob
i t + ËZi + Ái t (1)
The dependent variable, ln(y), is the natural log of real covered-earnings (nominal
covered-earnings from the database deflated into 1992 dollars by the all-items
Consumer Price Index, or CPI). The earnings equation is estimated separately by
sex and HRS cohort and employs a flexible functional form that allows for (reading
the terms on the right-hand side of the equation from right to left in order)
calendar-year effects; time-varying returns to the respondent’s education, measured
by educational attainment group, g (high school graduate, some college, college
graduate, graduate degree); time-varying quartic age-earnings profiles; time-varying
white-non-white earnings gaps; and time-varying returns to government jobs. In
addition, the specification includes a vector of explanatory variables, Z, which
include a large set of time-invariant differences in earnings that are interpreted
as part of the individual’s human capital endowment: an indicator for whether US
born; sets of indicators for mother’s and father’s education, respectively, measured
by educational attainment group (high school graduate, some college, college grad-
uate, and education not reported); own Census region of birth; and interactions of
race, education, and region of birth.
22 Actual earnings were used from the calendar year the respondent turned 20
through 1979, for those person-year observations with actual earnings below the
FICA cap; for those observations with earnings above the FICA cap, the larger
of the predicted value from the earnings equation and the cap was used. For
1980 through the year prior to the entry year, the actual uncapped earnings were
taken from the W-2 database for all observations. Finally, earnings were forecast
for years beginning with the entry year and future years up until the quit date,
producing a real earnings history from age 20 until the quit date. For respondents
who did not give consent, the predicted values from the estimation based on their
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socio-demographic characteristics were used to calculate an earnings growth rate
from each single year of age, starting at 20, to the age in the survey entry year. Then
using the respondent-reported annual earnings in the survey entry year, annual
earnings were backdated using these growth rates. Finally, earnings were forecasted
from the survey entry year to the quit date.
23 For those individuals having matched earnings records, the voluntary contribu-
tions were taken from the W-2 data; for those lacking a match, voluntary contribu-
tions were those self-reported in the in-person interview.
Appendix
Table 10A-1 Annual Real Returns and Inflation, 1972–91, in %
Year Annual Real Return on a Portfolio of
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflation 100%
Stocks
100%
Bonds
50% Stocks,
50% Bonds
1972 3.2 14.0 3.6 8.8
1973 6.0 −24.3 −7.3 −15.8
1974 10.5 −42.3 −14.7 −28.5
1975 8.7 24.9 6.9 15.9
1976 5.6 16.7 12.4 14.5
1977 6.3 −14.0 −4.8 −9.4
1978 7.3 −2.3 −8.7 −5.5
1979 10.8 4.4 −16.8 −6.2
1980 12.7 16.4 −14.4 1.0
1981 9.8 −13.6 −9.8 −11.7
1982 6.0 15.6 31.6 23.6
1983 3.2 16.6 2.4 9.5
1984 4.2 2.2 11.7 6.9
1985 3.5 24.2 22.6 23.4
1986 1.8 15.8 17.0 16.4
1987 3.6 0.8 −4.6 −1.9
1988 4.1 11.2 5.8 8.5
1989 4.7 22.8 10.5 16.7
1990 5.3 −9.2 0.7 −4.2
1991 4.1 23.6 15.1 19.4
1972–91 mean 6.1 5.2 2.6 4.1
1984–91 mean 3.9 11.4 9.8 10.6
Notes: This table shows the real asset returns for three representative portfolios and
inflation for the twenty years prior to the 1992 HRS. Real returns calculated by Ibbotson
(2003). Bonds are defined as Aaa corporate bonds. Stock returns are based on the S&P
500. Inflation was calculated by the authors from government sources for the CPI-U.
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